The US presidential election, which has been dominating the global news, will come to its natural culmination on November 5, even if the outcome remains uncertain for many more days.
Pyongyang, North Korea June 19, 2024. Vladimir Putin is in North Korea for a two-day diplomatic visit. Photo: Contributor/Getty Images
Even in Russia, where war and inflation are major concerns, official sources report that more than 60 percent of adults are following the US elections. Independent polls show that only about 19 percent are following closely, however (TASS, October 31).
Trump preference in Russia
While around half of Russians think that the election’s outcome is of little importance to their country, those who do care about the result strongly prefer former President Donald Trump (Levada.ru, October 31). The Kremlin appears to have the same preference — and few reservations against acting on it — all while decrying the United States’ accusations of Russian interference as slander (Izvestiya, November 2).
Mainstream political experts in Moscow produce competent analyses of the issues at stake in the US elections, emphasizing the depth of divisions between the elites and society and assessing the dynamics of US disengagement from European affairs (Rossiiskaya Gazeta, October 29). The Russian leadership, however, is less interested in the long-term trends and more focused on grasping the opportunities created by the Biden administration’s extreme preoccupation with gaining potential votes in battleground states and avoiding controversial actions in its foreign policy (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, October 31).
Partner in North Korea
In this opportunistic maneuvering, Russian President Vladimir Putin has a useful partner in North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un, who has abandoned the traditional mantra of Korean reunification and is keen to play fast and loose in the space left open by US inattentiveness (RIAC, September 2).
This maneuvering includes the arrival of North Korean troops in Russia (see EDM, October 30). The plan, most likely agreed on during Putin’s visit to Pyongyang last June and enacted in mid-October, envisaged the “export” of some 1,500 elite special forces initially and then around 10,000–15,000 “light infantry” soldiers to Russia for quick training and subsequent use in combat operations (see EDM, June 24; Svoboda.org, October 21).
In hindsight, this arrangement is entirely logical. Putin is determined to sustain the offensive push in Donbas oblast, and every tactical advance consumes tons of artillery shells and hundreds of lives (Republic.ru, October 30). Much in the same way, as trainloads of munitions from North Korea are needed to supplement Russia’s domestic production, battalions of obedient soldiers will compensate for diminishing recruitment, which already is causing an acute shortage of industrial labor and brewing social discontent (see EDM, August 7, October 10; Meduza, October 28).
At the current rate of Russian casualties, 10,000 new recruits must be attained every week. When visiting Moscow last week, Choe Son Hui, the Foreign Minister of North Korea, confirmed that Kim ordered that Russia be granted all necessary support in its “sacred war” (RBC, November 1; NV.ua, November 2).
Russian compensation to North Korea
The scope of Russian demand is relatively clear, but the character of its supply to North Korea remains uncertain. It is rather improbable that the export of oil and wheat, necessary as these commodities are, provides sufficient compensation for using another nation’s soldiers as cannon fodder (Novaya Gazeta Europe, October 23).
Feasibly, it could have been a coincidence that North Korea made a successful launch of the Malligyong-1 reconnaissance satellite in November 2023, two months after the cordial meeting between Putin and Kim at the Vostochny Cosmodrome (Interfax, May 28). It could be another coincidence that last Thursday, as the first North Korean troops arrived in Kursk oblast, Kim took his daughter to observe the test launch of the heavy intercontinental ballistic missile Hwasong-19 from the Pyongyang region (RIA Novosti, November 1). Coincidences happen, but the fast progress of North Korea’s missile program is likely achieved with the help of Russian expertise and technology transfer (RE: Russia, October 28).
Avoiding escalation
South Korea is the country most alarmed by the surging establishment of an axis between Moscow and Pyongyang. Defense Minister Kim Yong-Hyun traveled to Washington, DC, to coordinate a response. Seoul’s reaction also involved sending a monitoring mission to Kyiv (Vedomosti, November 1). Japan and the United States moved air assets, including one B-1B strategic bomber, to conduct a trilateral military drill with South Korea to demonstrate unity.
Still, it is rather obvious for Moscow that Washington’s primary concern at present is avoiding escalation (Kommersant, November 1). Many European politicians share this sentiment, but Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s argument that the deployment of North Korean troops constitutes an escalatory step that endangers global security is irrefutable (Interfax Ukraine, November 1). All convenient doubts regarding North Korea’s involvement in Ukraine are now dispelled, as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Secretary General Mark Rutte confirmed North Korean troops’ arrival, a clear signal of Putin’s desperation (News.ru, October 28).
Role of Beijing
Proper and proportional responses to this escalation are still being discussed, and Washington’s permission to Kyiv to deliver missile strikes on Moscow — as well as Pyongyang — with long-range weapon systems is still pending (The Moscow Times, October 28).
Beijing is the only entity that can discourage Putin and Kim from escalating any further during the presumed window of opportunity provided by the US elections (Kommersant, November 1). China is allegedly discontented by the swift transportation of North Korean troops to the Ukrainian front, which goes against its declared goal of negotiating a ceasefire and eventually a settlement to the conflict (Vedomosti, November 2; NV.ua, November 3).
Russia feigns innocence in upsetting its senior strategic partner, all the while its pundits persist with assertions that Western attempts to provoke tensions in Russia-China relations are doomed to failure (RIAC, November 1).
Dissimilar anxieties
Autocratic and rogue regimes of various persuasions have strikingly dissimilar anxieties on the stakes of the US elections. China generally prefers stability and predictability, and Venezuela is quite content with more of the same, while Iran is so nervous about tipping the balance in the presumably close vote that it could potentially postpone its “retaliatory” strike on Israel (South China Morning Post; Venezuelanalysis, November 1; The Times of Israel, October 31, November 3; see Terrorism Monitor, September 11).
However, it gives a new impetus to Western efforts at demonstrating solidarity, a source of strength, to which Putin and Kim have no access or understanding. Ukraine is on the receiving end of the Russian-North Korean experiments on boosting each other’s crucial capabilities, which are premised on the United States’ reluctance to commit to consequential decisions. Ukraine’s defiance has, nevertheless, become a force that encourages the Global West to stand together despite the disarray their democratic processes may produce.
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